32D Red Arrow Infantry Division and Brigade

In the Fall of 1942 the Japanese were in control of half of the Pacific and a large portion of the Asian continent.  It was felt that they were seriously considering an invasion of Australia.  The U.S. Navy’s victories at the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June of 1942 had improved the strategic situation somewhat.  But these defeats did not deter the Japanese from continuing their two pronged offensive in the Southwest Pacific with the objective of cutting the supply line from America to Australia and New Zealand.  The eastern drive through the Solomon Islands was eventually halted at Guadalcanal.

The western drive was attempted in order to gain control of southeastern New Guinea, especially the Papuan capital of Port Moresby, which would put them in striking distance of Australia and would strengthen their defenses in the Southwest Pacific.  The Japanese defeat during the Battle of the Coral Sea halted their effort to capture Port Moresby by sea.  Undaunted, the Japanese landed troops at Buna, Gona and Sanananda on the northeast coast of Papua in July and pushed southward across the Papuan peninsula toward Port Moresby.

 

 

Control of the north coast of New Guinea was also vital to future Allied strategy.  Taking it from the Japanese would remove the threat of an attack on Australia and would reduce the threat to the Allied supply line from America.  Air bases established on New Guinea would increase the reach of Allied planes.  From these bases, the Allies could threaten the center of Japanese power in the Southwest Pacific, Rabaul.

Before you read of the 32^D Division’s experiences and victory in the Papuan Campaign, it is important that you become aware of the many variables which contributed directly to the Division’s performance.  As you will soon read, the early stages of the campaign did not go well.  But you will later read that the Division eventually prevailed, by overcoming the multitude of challenges that it faced through the tremendous sacrifices, sheer determination and conspicuous bravery its soldiers.

The 32^D Division’s early difficulties, like most American units early in the war, were partly the result of the fact that America had a very small standing military before World War II.  The resulting rapid military expansion necessitated by the war contributed to serious early deficiencies in leaders, weapons, equipment and training.  The turnover of senior leaders and sudden influx of inexperienced, raw recruits had been considerable.  The Division’s training was adversely affected by its reorganization from a ‘square’ division to a ‘triangular’ division shortly before it entered combat.  Its training was further hampered by its sudden change of mission (from Europe to the Pacific Theater) and the resulting moves related to that change.  During the period from February 1942, when General Harding took command, to the Division’s arrival in the combat zone in mid-September, the Division was, as Harding said, “always getting ready to move, on the move, or getting settled after a move. (qtd. in Blakeley 84)”

In Australia, the Division’s initial training was geared toward the fact that its most likely course of action would be to defend Australia against an invasion by the Japanese.  When it was realized that the Division would instead carry the fight to the Japanese in the jungles of New Guinea, the needed jungle training was inhibited by lack of time and resources.  Little was known about Japanese fighting techniques.  Training sites and training aids for jungle training, as well as weapons and equipment adapted to jungle warfare, were inadequate or non-existent.  In addition to supply and equipment shortages that seem to be common in all wars, the Southwest Pacific had the major handicap of its incredibly long supply lines.  The chain of command, from MacArthur, through two Australian headquarters, to the Division, was the cause of some problems.

Also, the Division was initially committed to battle with only two of its infantry regiments (one of which was almost immediately taken away), and none of its organic artillery, save one howitzer and some mortars.  “The artillery at the disposal of the 32nd Division during the campaign never exceeded eight Australian guns of various light calibers and one 105 mm American howitzer. (Blakeley 56)”  These few artillery pieces had to support the Australian forces as well as the 32^D Division.

The climate and terrain in Papua could not have been worse.  The terrain around Buna was swampy and flat.  Most of the area consisted of incredibly dense vegetation which was a considerable obstacle not only to movement, but also observation, communications (wire and radio), fire (both direct and indirect), air support, supply, and evacuation.  The climate of the area was wet, hot and humid.  The rainy season was just beginning; the rivers were deeper, wider and faster than normal and the swamps were wetter than normal as well.  All of the tropical diseases prevalent in this type of environment flourished, including malaria, dengue fever, dysentery, athlete’s foot, ringworm and others.  Effective medicines to prevent and treat these diseases were not readily available.

Another issue that would have a direct impact on the Division was the inaccurate information available about the disposition of the Japanese forces.  The natives provided the Division G2 with information that led him to believe the Japanese garrison at Buna was about a battalion.  The Army Air Forces found no signs of the Japanese or their defensive positions.  General MacArthur’s headquarters also seriously underestimated the strength and effectiveness of the enemy at Buna.  Based on what they had been told, the belief in the 32^D Division was that Buna could be captured easily.

As was soon learned, at great cost, the Japanese had a well prepared position extending for over ten miles along the coast.  It consisted of three main defensive groups at Gona, Sanananda and Buna.  The Japanese were able to use the open beach for rapid communication between these groups.  The attackers had to struggle through impenetrable jungles and swamps.  The American and Australian attacks were highly canalized on narrow fronts because there were few trails through the swamps and jungle.  The Japanese were very familiar with these few and poor avenues of approach, so they were well covered by fire from well prepared, mutually supporting positions.  These positions were solidly constructed, to include effective overhead cover, from heavy logs, and steel oil drums filled with sand.  Some positions were made of concrete and steel.  They were all excellently camouflaged; the fast growing jungle vegetation made them nearly invisible.

Best estimates suggest a force of about 6,500 Japanese in the Buna area in mid-November; of these about 1,000 were fresh reinforcements from Rabaul.  Aside from the fresh troops, the Japanese were not in great shape.  They consisted of fragments of several different army, navy and marine units, making their organization problematic.  Many were sick or exhausted.  Weapons, food and medical supplies were in short supply, but stocks of ammunition were adequate.  Despite these hardships, and aided by their advantageous defensive positions, they still possessed the will and the capability of putting up a strong fight.

“More important still was the fact that for most men concerned it was their first experience under fire.  No training, no tests, no personal evaluations quite equal to the first trial by fire.  It is a painful definitive shakedown for every unit.  Often the unexpected happens.  A loud-mouthed, aggressive leader folds up; a quiet, unimpressive man becomes a natural leader; and sometimes the braggart makes good and the timid man becomes more timid . . . the unit will never again be as unstable as it was during its first fight.” (Blakeley 55)