The 32nd 'Red Arrow' Veteran Association
	The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II "The Red Arrow" Part 7 The New Guinea Campaign - Aitape and the Driniumor River

Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32nd Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the 'Red Arrow's' 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32nd Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book.

In order to capture Hollandia, Gen. MacArthur would need strong air support. However, Hollandia was beyond the range of land-based aircraft. The Navy, which was preparing for large scale operations in the Marianas, would only commit to 3-days of carrier support at Hollandia. So the decision was made to seize the Japanese airstrip near Aitape, about 140 miles east of Hollandia, in order to provide land-based air support after the aircraft carriers were withdrawn. Allied ground forces at Aitape would also be able to protect the Hollandia assault units from interference by the Japanese forces at Wewak.

    "The ground operations at both Hollandia and Aitape were to be undertaken by a force designated as Alamo Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, also commander of U.S. Sixth Army. Two task forces, designated Reckless and Persecution, were set up to take Hollandia and Aitape respectively. The commander of Persecution Task Force was to be Brigadier General Jens A. Doe, assistant Division commander of the 41st Infantry Division, with the 163rd Infantry Regiment of that division as his principal unit.
    "Initially, the plan provided that the 127th Infantry reinforced, was to be the Alamo Force reserve for the Hollandia-Aitape operation. But General Krueger carefully considered the Japanese capability of making a determined effort to recapture the Aitape area by a strong counterattack with some part of the 50,000 to 60,000 Japanese 18th Army troops stationed in the Wewak area less than 100 miles away. And then he decided to use the 127th as part of Persecution Task Force, and not as reserve. This required the obtaining of a new reserve from General MacArthur. After some discussion, the 32nd Division, less two regimental combat teams, was given to Krueger as Alamo Force reserve. The two RCTs not in this reserve were the 127th, and 128th which was to remain in the Saidor area.
    "The Japanese strength at Aitape was believed to be about 3,500, including 1,500 combat troops. But it was also thought that by the time of the attack the Japanese might have 3,000 more at hand." (Blakeley 149-150)

    "Aitape had been occupied by the enemy in December 1942- The entire region is a coastal plain, varying from 5 to 12 miles in width, swampy in many places and cut by numerous streams. The only prominent terrain feature on the coast is a small hill at Aitape. There are no natural eastern or western boundaries in the area. To the north lies the Pacific Ocean, and south of the coastal plain rise the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains. Off shore, about 8 miles east of Aitape, are four small islands. Good landing beaches exist throughout the region, the best a few miles east of Aitape. The absence of suitable terrain features makes difficult the defense of the area against amphibious assault. The many rivers vary greatly in width and depth according to the amount of rainfall.
    "April marks the end of the wettest season in the Aitape region, where rainfall averages about 100 inches per year. Though June is one of the driest months, July is one of the wettest, with almost 8 inches of rain. Torrential tropical downpours rather than prolonged rains are to be expected at Aitape.
     "Japanese development in the area centered around airfield construction near Tadji Plantation, about 8 miles east-southeast of Aitape . . . Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese ground defenses in the Aitape area were weak. It therefore seemed probable that there would be little opposition to a landing and that the assault force, once ashore, could quickly seize the air strip area." (qtd. in Blakeley 150)

On 18 April Persecution Task Force departed from the Finschhafen area.

On 22 April at 0645 the 163rd Infantry landed as scheduled. "The naval gunfire support and the air attacks were carried out according to plan. Such tactical surprise was achieved, that the landings were almost without opposition. By dark, the force had established a beachhead and started work on the airfield." (Blakeley 150)

On 23 April the majority of the 127th Infantry and the 126th FA BN landed at the beachhead. "Companies F and G captured two of the offshore islands with little difficulty early the same morning, and Company G occupied a third two days later." (Blakeley 153)

On 26 April the 127th Infantry's 1st BN came ashore.

The 127th Infantry took up positions on the left flank of the beachhead and sent patrols eastward to the Driniumor River.

On 28 April, the 127th's Co. C, and part of Co. D, established an outpost in the vicinity of Nyaparake, on the coast 20 miles to the east, in order to be able to detect enemy movement toward Aitape from Wewak.

    "In the end, the enemy garrison of the whole Aitape area turned out to be less than 1,000 men of all arms and services. And most of them had fled inland. This relatively easy victory at Aitape paralleled an almost equally rapid success at Hollandia. And this brought two decisions affecting the 32nd Division. General Doe and his 163rd RCT were to be pulled out of the Aitape operation and used in a new assault in the Wakde-Sarmi area about 250 miles further northwest. General Gill was to take over from General Doe as GC of Persecution Task Force, and additional 32nd Division troops were to brought in." (Blakeley 153)

The Approach to the Philippines details these changes:

     "The 32nd Infantry Division, less two regiments, was to move from Saidor in eastern New Guinea to Aitape to relieve the 163rd RCT. The 127th RCT of the 32nd Division had already arrived at Aitape. Initially, the 128th RCT was to remain at Saidor as part of the Alamo Force reserve for Wakde-Sarmi. The remainder of the 32nd Division, consisting of the 126th RCT and division troops, arrived at Blue Beach (this was the main beach in the Aitape area) on 4 May. Major General William H. Gill, the division commander, immediately assumed command of the Persecution Task Force and two days later his division staff, after becoming acquainted with the situation in the Aitape area, began activity as Headquarters, Persecution Task Force.
     "Just before the Wakde-Sarmi operation began, it was decided to move the 128th Infantry from Saidor to Aitape so that the unit would be closer to its potential objective in case of need. Noncombat ships being available, the 128th Infantry (less the 3rd Bn) was shipped to Blue Beach where it arrived on 15 May. The rest of the regiment, together with rear echelons of other 32nd Division units, arrived at Aitape later in the month. Early in June the 128th Infantry was released from its Alamo Force reserve role for Wakdi-Sarmi and reverted to the control of the 32nd Division and the Persecution Task Force." (qtd. in Blakeley 153)

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Troops of the 32nd Infantry Division march off the beach at Korake, Aitape, Dutch New Guinea to their bivouac area on 3 May 1944.

    "From the first, the East Sector was the most active one. Colonel Merle H. Howe, CO of the 127th Infantry, took command of the sector on 6 May. On the 7th, the Nyaparake Force (Company C, reinforced, of the 127th Infantry, under CPT Tally D. Fulmer) started patrols to the east and inland. Reinforced on the 8th by a rifle platoon and a light-machine gun section from Company A, and aided by Seventh Fleet patrol craft and RAAF P-40s, CPT Fulmer pushed the bulk of his force eastward against increasing enemy opposition. On the night of 13-14 May, three attacks struck his small command. The rest of Company A, under CPT Herman Bottcher, who had won the DSC and battlefield promotion from Sergeant during the Papuan campaign, had also been moved eastward along the coast. On the 14th, Captain Fulmer’s force was surrounded and Captain Bottcher’s force harassed by strong patrols. There was obviously no point in sacrificing these troops. Their reinforcement and supply was not practicable, nor was the retention of their positions essential to the Division’s principal mission of defending Tadji airfield. So General Gill promptly decided to evacuate both detachments to Nyaparake by small craft. This was done the next day." (Blakeley 154)

On 19 May, Gen. Gill placed BG Clarence Martin (assistant Division commander), in charge of the East Sector and made CPT Bottcher commander of Nyaparake Force, which was comprised of Co. A, 127th Infantry and the 32nd Reconnaissance Troop after Co. C was relieved from the force.

On 22 May CPT Bottcher's force encountered a strong Japanese attack and initiated a planned withdrawal to the west. Several times during the next few days Nyaparake Force became cut off and had to fight its way out of encirclement. Gen. Gill, believing that the enemy was making a determined effort toward the airfield at Tadji, started to shift the 126th Infantry's 1st BN from the Western Sector to BG Martin's Eastern Sector where it could be used to counterattack the Japanese westward advance.

On 30 May, all available U.S and Australian service members in the area participated in a Memorial Day ceremony at the new cemetery at the beachhead.

On 31 May LTC Cladie A. Bailey's 1st Bn, 126th Infantry, encountered serious opposition east of the village of Yakamul. The next day he was ordered to return to Yakamul and send patrols inland along the Harech River to the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains, a distance of about 5 miles. At the same time, CPT Bottcher's units were relieved by Co. G, 127th Inf. and Batt. B, 126th FA, approximately 2 miles to the west of Yakamul. "The experiences of LTC Bailey’s battalion in the next few days are well told in the Approach to the Philippines, and the account is reproduced here because it gives a rather typical picture of a 32nd Infantry Battalion both seeking information and imposing delay on a Japanese advance." (Blakeley 155)

     "During the night of 1-2 June, Japanese artillery shelled the battalion command post and enemy patrols drove in outposts which had been set up east of Yakamul. The next morning the battalion was divided into two parts. At Yakamul was stationed Company A, Headquarters Company, and part of Company D. This combined group, numbering about 350 men, was put under the command of Captain Gile A. Herrick of Company A and designated Herrick Force. The rest of the Battalion, now called Bailey Force, moved south down the trail from Yakamul to patrol the Harech River.
     "The Japanese soon became very active around the perimeter of Herrick Force. On 3 June the enemy launched a series of minor attacks against Company A, which was separated from the rest of Herrick Force by a small, unbridged stream about four feet deep and varying in width from ten to fifty yards. Under cover of these attacks, other Japanese groups bypassed Herrick Force to the south and on the next morning appeared west of Yakamul, between Herrick Force and the two-mile distant perimeter of Company G, 127th Infantry.
     "Sporadic small arms fire, intensifying during the afternoon, was directed at all parts of Herrick Force perimeter during 4 June. About 1640 this fire was augmented by mortar and artillery shells, a development which seemed to presage an imminent Japanese infantry attack. At 1830 an enemy force of more than Company strength surged out of the jungle on the southeast side of the American perimeter in an apparent attempt to drive a wedge between Company A and the rest of Herrick Force. The attack was halted by automatic weapons fire and the barrier presented by the small stream. The enemy then turned northeast from the creek against Company A. Simultaneously, a small group of enemy attacked west along the beach.
     "Because Company A was in danger of being surrounded, Captain Herrick ordered the unit to withdraw across the small stream to Yakamul. Since the Japanese had the stream covered with small arms and at least one well-concealed machine gun, the withdrawal was a slow process and consumed over an hour. During the movement the Japanese continued to attack, and, toward the end of the hour, succeeded in overrunning some of Company A’s automatic-weapons positions. Deprived of this support, most of the remaining troops retreated rapidly across the stream, leaving behind radios, mortars, machine guns and twenty to twenty-five dead and wounded men. Most of the wounded managed to get across the stream after darkness, which was approaching at the time of the enemy’s final attack.
  "By 1940 the Japanese were in complete possession of the Company A position, whence they could send flanking fire toward the Yakamul perimeter. Captain Herrick ordered his men to dig in deeply. He reorganized his positions and even put some of the lightly wounded on defensive posts. Japanese ground attacks kept up until 2200, and sporadic bursts of mortar, grenade, and machine gun fire continued throughout the night.
     "When he learned of the situation at Yakamul, General Martin ordered Bailey Force to return to the coast and relieve Herrick Force. Radio communication difficulties prevented delivery of this order until 2000 and it was 2200 before Colonel Bailey could organize his force in the darkness and heavy jungle and start it moving north. By that time the Japanese had a strong force blocking the trail to Yakamul. After an arduous overland march through trackless, heavily jungled terrain, the leading elements of Bailey Force began straggling into Company G’s perimeter about 1130 on 5 June.
     "Gen. Martin then ordered Bailey Force to move east and drive the Japanese from the Yakamul area, but this order was changed when the East Sector commander learned that Bailey Force had been marching for over thirteen hours on empty stomachs and was not yet completely assembled at Company G’s perimeter. Bailey Force was thereupon fed from Company G’s  limited food supply and sent west along the coastal trail to the Driniumor River. Company G and the battery of the 126th Field Artillery Battalion which it had been protecting moved back to the Driniumor late in the afternoon.
     "Meanwhile, the evacuation of Herrick Force from Yakamul had also been ordered, and about 1115 on 5 June small boats arrived at Yakamul from Blue Beach to take the beleaguered troops back to the Tadji area. Insofar as time permitted, radios, ammunition and heavy weapons for which there was no room on the boats were destroyed. As this work was under way, a few light mortars and light machine guns kept up a steady fire on the Japanese who, now surrounding the entire perimeter, had been harassing Herrick Force since dawn. At the last possible moment, just when it seemed the Japanese were about to launch a final infantry assault, Captain Herrick ordered his men to make for the small boats on the run. The move was covered by friendly rocket and machine gun fire from an LCM standing off shore, while the Japanese took the running men under fire from the old Company A positions. So fast and well organized was the sudden race for the boats, that the Japanese had no time to get all their weapons into action, and only one American was wounded during the boarding. The small craft hurriedly left the area and took Herrick Force to Blue Beach, where the unit was re-equipped. By 1500 the troops had rejoined the rest of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, on the Driniumor River." (qtd. in Blakeley 155-157)

It was deemed necessary to establish a delaying position on the west side of the Driniumor. Although the river varied in width from 75-150 yards in this area, it was not a formidable obstacle because it was usually only about calf-deep, except after heavy rains. Thick jungle vegetation on both banks made it extremely difficult to detect movement on the other side. This delaying position was comprised of the 1st BN, 128th Inf. on the left, one company from the 126th Inf. in the center, and the 1st BN, 127th Inf. on the right. If the Japanese attacked, these soldiers were to hold this line as long as they could. Then, if necessary, they were to withdraw westward and establish successive delay positions until they were pushed back to the main defensive position around the airfield.

These units continued to patrol the east side of the Driniumor in an effort to keep track of the enemies disposition, and they met more and more opposition. It was becoming increasingly evident to higher headquarters that the Japanese were likely preparing for a significant attack against Persecution Force, either to attempt to retake the airfield, or to simply tie up as many Allied units as possible in order to prevent their use elsewhere in the region.

As a result, reinforcements for Persecution Task Force began to arrive. At midnight on 27-28 June, newly arrived MG Charles P. Hall and his XI Corps staff assumed command of the growing Persecution Force. MG Hall soon reorganized his available units into 3 main elements, Western Sector, Eastern Sector, and Covering Force. Most of the newly arrived reinforcements were assigned to Western Sector. Gen. Gill and the 32nd Division were responsible for Eastern Sector. Gen. Martin controlled Covering Force, which was comprised of the 32nd Division elements he already controlled, plus the 112th Cavalry RCT, a nondivisional unit commanded by BG Julian W. Cunningham. While it was assigned to Covering Force, the strength of 112th Cavalry was only about half of the strength of an infantry regiment.

Gen. Hall also continued to make improvements to the main defensive positions protecting the airfield. "Hall enclosed the vital airstrips with a semicircular, ten-mile, defensive belt whose flanks rested on the sea. Along this line were more than 1,500 mutually protective log bunkers. Barbed wire obstacles and entanglements girded the line. Within that perimeter stood the equivalent of two divisions, including nine infantry battalions. Fifteen miles east, however, only three infantry battalions and two understrength cavalry squadrons defended the Driniumor River line. They had little barbed wire, few bunkers, poor fields of fire, and miserable jungle tracks for communication." (Drea 27)

By the end of June, Covering Force consisted of 3rd BN, 127th Inf. (which had recently relieved the 127th's 1st BN), and 2nd Squadron, 112th Cav. on the right; 2nd BN, 128th Inf., in the center; and 1st BN, 128th Inf., and Co. B, 632nd Tank Destroyer BN, on the left. The 120th and 129th FA BNs were positioned to provide artillery support.

    "But when the expected attack did not develop, patrols from the Covering Force could not locate any large enemy forces in the vicinity. So General Krueger then ordered General Hall to send a reconnaissance in force east from the Driniumor to find out what the enemy’s dispositions really were. It was surely undesirable to keep Allied troops urgently needed for other operations tied up at Aitape if the Japanese 18th Army had no offensive intentions." (Blakeley 160)

Gen. Martin was tasked with the reconnaissance mission, but he was not supplied more units to perform it. This left him in a difficult position. He would have to release a sizable number of the limited troops he had available to conduct the reconnaissance, but he would also have to maintain his defensive line along the Driniumor in case the Japanese were able to sneak past his reconnaissance units in the thick jungle. This meant that the troops left to maintain the delay position would be spread very thin.

Early on 10 July the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cav. and 1st BN, 128th Inf., crossed the Driniumor to conduct the reconnaissance. The Cavalry troopers on the right faced a difficult move through the swamp but encountered no Japanese. The Infantry soldiers on the left near the coast had less difficult terrain to contend with, but they met significant enemy opposition. Aided by good artillery support they nearly reached Yakamul, but they suffered 5 KIA and 8 WIA during the day.

Back at the delay position the 1st Squadron, 112th Cav. was now responsible to hold a front of 3,000 yards on the right end of the line. The 3rd BN, 127th Inf. was spread out for 1 1/2 miles in the center sector. The 2nd BN, 128th Inf. was responsible for the remainder of the line on the left, stretching nearly 3 1/2 miles to the coast. Patrols were sent out all along the line throughout the day, and all of them made contact with the Japanese. The line was told to be prepared for an attack that night and the units conducting the reconnaissance were told to continue pushing east the next morning.

    "Shortly before midnight, after a short artillery preparation, which came as a surprise because no enemy artillery had been identified within range of the Driniumor, [10,000] enemy infantry in screaming waves began charging across the river against Companies E and G 128th Infantry, in the south part of the sector of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry." (Blakeley 160)

The Japanese were severely punished by prepared artillery concentrations and well-placed machine gun and mortar fire from the vastly outnumbered and undermanned Covering Force.

    "GIs fired their machine guns and automatic rifles until the barrels turned red hot, but the Japanese, eerily visible under the light of the flares, surged forward. American artillery fell in clusters on the Japanese infantrymen, killing and maiming hundreds or crushing others beneath the tall trees that snapped apart in the unceasing explosions." (Drea 28)

    "The attack in the Company G sector was stopped, but another attack which hit Company E shortly after the first assault was more successful largely because of the physical impossibility of holding a position in the dark against an attacking force believed to have a ten to one superiority over the defenders. By dawn the Japanese held a good-sized area of wooded high ground to the left rear of Company G." (Blakeley 160-1)

The 1st BN, 128th Inf., withdrew successfully but suffered 3 KIA, 3 MIA, and 13 WIA during the process.
One of those KIA was SSG Gerald L. Endl, of Co. C, 128th Inf., and from Fort Atkinson, Wisconsin. SSG Endl was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic efforts to rescue several of his wounded comrades and to cover the withdrawal of his platoon on 11 July 1944. SSG Endl's Medal of Honor citation can be read on the 32nd Division Medal of Honor page of this web site.

At around 1000 on 11 July 2nd Squadron, 112th Cav., made it back to the west side of the river and later in afternoon it moved further west to the next delaying position. The 3rd Bn, 127th Infantry, withdrew to the 2nd delaying position in two groups, the first commanded by LTC Edward Bloch, the BN CO, the second group was commanded by CPT Leonard Lowry, of Co. I. The 2nd Bn, 128th Inf., withdrew as several smaller groups.

At dawn on 12 July Covering Force was again prepared to conduct their delay mission from their new positions. However, CPT Lowry’s detachment didn’t arrive until 13 July due to the difficult terrain and continued enemy contact.

    "In the meantime, General Hall had begun making a series of changes designed to make possible a prompt counterattack against the enemy troops threatening his area. He put General Gill in command of the Covering Force, and General Martin in command of Eastern Sector. He attached the 124th Infantry [31st 'Dixie' Division] (less one battalion) to the Covering Force.
    "Using part of the Headquarters, 32d Division, General Gill set up a new headquarters for the Covering Force, and reorganized the Covering Force into two groups. The North Force, commanded by Brigadier General Alexander N. Stark, Jr., who had been commanding Western Sector, consisted of the two battalions of the 124th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry. South Force, under General Cunningham, was composed of the 112th Cavalry, and the 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. (The Army’s official history says that the South Force was also called Baldy Force – “a reference to the condition of Gen. Cunningham’s pate.”) The 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry, was the Covering Force reserve. Four artillery batteries, including the 120th and 129th from the 32nd Division, furnished the artillery support.
    "The North Force attack started at 0730 on 13 July. Aided by good artillery support, the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry fought its way back to the Driniumor while the 124th Infantry turned south and cleared the area along the river, a task completed with some difficulty. A Japanese attack on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry, near Tiver, was repulsed, and except for minor remnants of the enemy forces the situation in the North Force sector was now restored.
    "South Force, separated from North Force by a swamp, moved eastward at 1000 on 13 July. Assisted by Australian air attacks, it reached the Driniumor about 1445. On the 14th, its efforts to establish contact with North Force were unsuccessful. During the night of 14-15 July, the enemy attempted to take advantage of this situation, but ran into the 3rd Battalion, 124th Infantry, and sustained heavy losses. It was not until 18 July that the gap was completely closed and Persecution’s Covering Force reestablished all along the Driniumor. There remained, however, a considerable number of enemy small forces in the area behind the positions along the river. To clear up this situation, General Hall released the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 127th Infantry to General Gill’s command. Of the nine organic infantry battalions of the 32d Division, five were now under Gill’s tactical command; the other four (the three of the 126th Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the 128th) remained on the main defensive position around the airfield. All, of course, continued under his administrative control as Division commander." (Blakeley 163-4)

Second Lieutenant Dale Eldon Christensen, of Troop E, 112th Cavalry, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for several examples of heroic leadership along the Driniumor River during 16-19 July 1944. On 16 July he crawled to within 15 yards of a Japanese machine gun position that had pinned down his unit and he silenced the machine gun with his grenades. On 19 July he successfully led his platoon in an attack to eliminate a Japanese position of 4 mortars and 10 machine guns. He eliminated one of the machine guns by himself with grenades after his rifle was shot out of his hands. 2LT Christensen was from Iowa. He was KIA on 4 August 1944 near Afua while leading his unit in an attack on another enemy machine gun position.

    "The two battalions assigned to the clean up task had several days and nights of involved patrolling and fighting complicated by lack of any definite information about the enemy’s strength and dispositions and by the difficult terrain, and also by communications failures. Movement of enemy troops along trails between South Force and the Torricelli Mountains was also reported, and South Force was subjected to several attacks culminating in the recapture of Afua by the Japanese. On the 22d, the two battalions were attached to General Cunningham’s South Force. This put all of the 127th Infantry in Cunningham’s command. The regimental commander, Colonel Howe, made a difficult trip with a small escort in order to report to Cunningham and arrange the movement of his two battalions into the South Force area.
    "Elements of both battalions were committed to action almost as soon as they arrived. Afua changed hands several times, and South Force engaged in over a week of complicated fighting, made particularly difficult by the broken jungle-covered terrain, the lack of roads, the inaccurate maps, and the mixing of units. By the end of the month the force was in an oval shaped perimeter not over eight hundred yards deep at any point. The 2nd Battalion, 127th Infantry, was facing the river with its left flank bent backward; the 112th Cavalry’s positions extended south and west; and the other two battalions of the 127th completed the perimeter on the west side." (Blakeley 164)

PVT Donald R. Lobaugh, from the 127th Infantry, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his conspicuous gallantry during the confused fighting around Afua on 22 July 1944. His platoon, led by Lt. John S. Kerlizyn, was surrounded by the Japanese. PVT Lobaugh suggested to his squad leader, SSG Edward L. Jirikowic, that he could keep the enemy preoccupied while the rest of the platoon escaped the encirclement. “Next thing,” the Sergeant said in telling the story of Lobaugh’s exploit, “I saw him crawling alone toward the enemy position. (qtd. in Blakeley 166)” PVT Lobaugh was from Freeport, Pennsylvania. His Medal of Honor citation can be read on the 32nd Division Medal of Honor page of this web site.

Second Lieutenant George W. G. Boyce, Jr., of Troop A, 112th Cavalry, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his self-sacrifice during the fighting near Afua on 23 July 1944. While leading his platoon in an effort to rescue another unit which had been cut off, 2LT Boyce threw himself on a grenade that had landed between him and his men. 2LT Boyce was from New York.

On 31 July Gen. Hall initiated a counterattack. At 0800 the 124th Infantry, reinforced with a battalion from the 169th Infantry (43rd Division), crossed to the east side of the Driniumor. These 4 battalions moved east and encountered varied enemy resistance, then they headed south to attempt to prevent any Japanese retreat, eliminate as many of them as possible, and prevent their reinforcement or resupply. 

    "The Army's The Approach to the Philippines summarizes the operations of the four battalions in these words: “While the envelopment was not as successful . . . as had been anticipated, or as it was thought to be at the time of its completion, the maneuver did force the [Japanese] 18th Army to accelerate its already planned withdrawal from the Driniumor.” In any case, the result was to relieve the pressure on South Force, and Cunningham promptly ordered an attack to clear the enemy remnants from his area. On 6 August the Force, which had been given two more battalions of Infantry, one of which was the 3rd Battalion of the 128th, began this task. It was completed by dark on the 9th. There was no longer any serious enemy threat to the Aitape area and its airfield." (Blakeley 167)

The 43rd Infantry Division now began to relieve the 32nd Division and assume the duties of Covering Force. The 32nd Division headed west toward Blue Beach. The battle for Aitape was officially completed as of 25 August 1944. The airfield at Tadji was securely in Allied hands and Aitape could now be used for a staging area to support further operations.

    "Among the command changes during August 1944 was the assignment of Colonel John A. Hettinger to the 128th Infantry, succeeding Lt. Col. Herbert A. Smith, who had been in temporary command of the regiment." (Blakeley 169)

Blakeley, H. W., Major General, Retired. The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II.  The Thirty-second Infantry Division History Commission, State of Wisconsin, n.d.
Cannon, M. Hamlin.  Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954.
Drea, Edward J.  New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.
Hill, Jim Dan, Major General, Retired.  The Minute Man in Peace and War.  Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964.
Jungwirth, Clarence J.  Diary of a National Guardsman in World War II.  Oshkosh, WI: Poeschl Printing Company, 1991.
Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1957.
Papuan Campaign - The Buna-Sanananda Operation.  Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1945.
The Red Arrow - 1955 - The 32nd Division, Wisconsin National Guard.  n.p., 1955.
Smith, Herbert M., Lieutenant Colonel, Retired. Hannibal Had Elephants II.  Eau Claire, WI: Rev. William A. Heins, 1995.