The 32nd 'Red Arrow' Veteran Association
	The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II "The Red Arrow" Part 3 The Papuan Campaign - The Battle of Buna

Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32nd Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the 'Red Arrow's' 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32nd Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book.

"The basic plan of attack was relatively simple. The objective was to destroy the enemy. The 32nd Infantry Division and the Australian 7th Division were to attack abreast, the 32nd Division on the right. The boundary between the divisions was to be the Girua River. Movement forward was to commence on 16 November 1942." (Blakeley 55)

On 15 November 1942 MG Harding issued Field Order No. 1 for the operation. A battalion of the 128th would move west along the coast to Cape Endaiadere; another would take the Buna airfield; the remaining battalion would be the Division reserve, held near Dobodura, where it would help the engineers prepare a landing strip. The 126th, minus 2nd Bn. which was still a few days away, would move to Inonda and later to Buna.

Here is a map of the Buna area, 16-21 Nov. '42, from the US Army Center of Military History web site.

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers of Co. L, 3rd Bn., 128th Inf., 32nd Division, crossing footbridge between Warisota Plantation and Borio, New Guinea on 15 November 1942.

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers of Co. L and Co. M, 128th Inf., 32nd Division, wading across the Samboga River between Borio and Dobodura, during the drive on Buna, New Guinea on 15 November 1942.

On 16 November the advance commenced according to plan. On the coast, the 128th Infantry moved forward in two columns. The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. McCoy)  moved up the trail toward Cape Endaiadere. The second column, a little further inland, was 3rd Battalion (LTC Miller) followed by 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Smith), headed for the bridge between the air strips near Buna Mission. On the left of the Division’s zone, Colonel Tomlinson's 126th Infantry (minus the 2nd Bn. which was near the end of its march over the Owen Stanleys) moved out from Bofu toward Inonda and Buna.

"On the other side of the Girua, to the left of the 32d Division, the Australian infantry also started its advance. The fight for Buna had begun with both the Americans and Australians anticipating an easy victory. (Blakeley 56)"

At 1845 on 16 November, 18 Japanese Zeros attacked the 32nd Division's supply boats off Cape Sudest (about 8 or 10 miles SE of Buna). These small boats were carrying ammunition, rations, radio supplies, 81mm mortars, .50 caliber machine guns, and equipment and personnel of the 22nd Portable Hospital. Also on board where MG Harding, BG Waldron, COL McKenny, and two Army Ground Forces observers – Colonel’s Harold F. Handy and Herbert B. Laux. The soldiers tried to fend off the Zeros with small arms fire, but they were unsuccessful. Soon the boats were burning and everyone was forced into the water when the ammunition started to explode. The two generals were among those who made it to shore, but COL McKenny and 23 others were killed and many others wounded. COL McKenny was succeeded by Major Ralph T. Birkeness as Division quartermaster. "Ten participants were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross: Colonel John J. Carew, 114th Engineer Battalion; Lieutenant John E. Harbert, Ordnance; Lieutenant Herbert G. Peabody, Division Headquarters Company; Staff Sergeant John R. MacGowan, Sergeant Howard J. Weiss, Corporal Gordon C. Snyder and Private Cloyd G. Myers of the 128th Infantry; Private First Class Donald R. Price, Privates Maro P. Johnson and Homer W. MacAllister of the 107th Quartermaster Battalion. (Blakeley 60)"

The next morning the Japanese knocked two of the three remaining boats out of commission. A crucial and irreplaceable supply link had been crippled; there were no other boats available. The weapons, equipment and supplies lost would soon be sorely missed. These same boats were also supposed to transport some of the Division's troops waiting at Pongani (about 25 miles from Buna), those units now faced an arduous trip on foot. The G4, LTC Joseph Sladen Bradley, and the rest of the Division, would now be even more dependent on the Army Air Force for resupply.

Somewhere around this time, one gun of Battery A, 129th Field Artillery, arrived at Dobodura.

"The 105mm howitzer of Battery A, 129th Field Artillery Battalion was loaded in a B-17 in Brisbane and flown to Port Moresby, together with a gun crew of eight men, equipment and 200 rounds of ammunition. Later it took three C-47 transport planes to carry the same load over the Owen-Stanley Mountains. The transports landed at Dobodura. Here the gun was assembled and Lieutenant Colonel Melvin McCreary immediately selected a position. After the gun was pulled up the trail a short distance northwest of Ango, 2d Lieutenant Herbert H. Jackson and his men commenced firing. The gun never left this position until the end of the Buna Campaign. The reason for not shifting was (1) positions were not available because of the terrain and (2) most of the 32d Division front was within range of the position occupied by the gun. It was the only American field piece brought up to support the 32d Infantry Division during the Papuan Campaign. Conditions for the Australians was much the same; only eight guns of various calibers were brought into action west of the Girua River." (Blakeley 67)

The 1st Bn., 128th made enemy contact 700 yards from Boreo, near the Duropa Plantation.

"It was met at that point by heavy machine gun and rifle fire from hidden enemy machine gun positions west of the track. The troops deployed and attacked, but the heavy overhead jungle growth made it difficult for them to use their mortars effectively and their grenades were of little use because they did not know where the enemy was or where the fire was coming from. The Japanese weapons gave off no flash, and the reverberation of their fire in the jungle made it impossible to ascertain their whereabouts by sound. To complicate matters, the Japanese made it a practice to rotate their weapons among several hidden positions, causing the inexperienced Americans, until they saw through the trick, to imagine themselves covered by automatic weapons from all sides." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 61)

"Out of rations, and with a greater part of its ammunition used up, the 1st battalion ended the day a badly shaken outfit. The troops had entered the battle joking and laughing, and sure of an easy victory. Now they were dazed and taken aback by the mauling they had received at the hands of the Japanese. Nor did it escape them that the bodies of the few Japanese left on the field were those of fresh, well-fed, well-armed troops - not, as they had been led to expect, the tired, emaciated, and disease-ridden survivors of the fighting in the Owen Stanleys. It was to be sometime before they and their fellows recovered from the shock of finding that the battle was to be no push-over, and that, instead of a short and easy mop-up, a long cruel fight lay ahead of them." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 61)

    "Colonel Miller's troops had an even ruder awakening. As the 3d Battalion approached the trail junction between the Old and New Strips, the Simemi Trail degenerated into a narrow causeway with swamp on either side. Attempts to get the troops through an open area about 300 yards south of the junction were met with such intense fire from the western end of the New Strip, from behind the bridge between the strips, and from machine guns forward of the junction itself that no further advance was possible that day.
    "Nor could Miller do much to blast out the enemy with fire. He had no 81mm mortars; most of the machine-gun cartridges he had with him were found to be of the wrong type, a large percentage of his grenades failed to go off; and he quickly ran out of .30-caliber ammunition and had to call for a fresh supply to be dropped to him from the air." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 61-2)

20 November showed little improvement for the 128th Infantry. The 1st Bn. was able to gain 200 yards; the 3rd Bn. went nowhere. 1LT. John W. Crow, who heroically led Co. C in knocking out several machine guns, was reported missing in action that day.

"Lieutenant Crow, last seen charging an enemy machine gun post, submachine gun in hand, was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross." (Milner 176)

As if things weren't already difficult enough for the 32nd Division, the situation was about to get worse. General Blamey, the New Guinea Force commander, with General MacArthur’s consent, decided to take the 126th Infantry away from MG Harding and give it to General Vassey, commander of the Australian 7th Division. The Australians weren't making any more progress than the 32nd was. Higher headquarters somehow thought that this was because "there seemed to be more Japanese in General Vassey’s area than in General Harding’s (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 65)" So they decided "that the main effort would therefore have to be made west of the Girua River. (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 65)"

MG Harding, rightly upset about the impending loss of half of his available combat power, just as the battle for Buna was getting underway; sent a message "'For General Herring's eyes only,' he urged that the decision to take the 126th Infantry away from him be reconsidered as likely to lead to confusion, resentment, and misunderstanding. (Blakeley 65)" General Herring's gruff response was, "the decision would have to stand, and that he was counting on Harding to make no more difficulties in the matter. (Blakeley 65)"

On 21 November, the 126th Infantry (minus detachments), along with a platoon from Co. A, 114th Engineer Bn. and some medical attachments, arrived at Soputa and were assigned to Brigadier Lloyd, commander of the Australian 16th Brigade.

"While the bulk of the troops in the 32nd Division’s left zone was being moved out of it, things were not going well on the right. (Blakeley 66)" A 0800 attack by the 1st and 3rd of the 128th and 1st of the 126th (-) did not go off because the commanders didn’t receive the attack orders until ¾ of an hour after H-hour. Air support for the attack arrived on schedule; but some of the bombs fell short, causing casualties in the 3rd of the 128th.

So General Harding rescheduled his attack for 1300. The infantry attack was to be preceded by a 1245 air attack, but no planes arrived. General Harding made another attempt for a coordinated attack, with air support.

"The air attack, by A-20s and B-25s, came in around 1600; it was not a success. Most of the planes could not find the target area; one flight dropped its bombs in the sea, and one B-25 got a direct hit on Companies B and C of the 128th, killing six, wounding twelve, and seriously affecting the will to fight of the whole battalion. The Japanese positions were virtually untouched and the attacks against them were easily repulsed with heavy casualties." (Blakeley 66)

"The troops along the coastal track fought desperately with rifles, Thompson submachine guns, light machine guns, and hand grenades. They knocked out a few machine gun nests during the day, as did the Australian Independant Company which was operating near the eastern end of the strip. Otherwise there was little progress. Casualties were heavy. In three days of combat, Company C [128th Inf.] lost sixty-three men, including all four of its officers. Two sergeants, killed within a few hours of each other, commanded it on the 21st. The two sergeants, 1SG Reuben J. Steger, and SSG Carl [J.] Cherney, both from Marshfield, Wisconsin, were posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross." (Milner 178) Company C, 128th Infantry was from Marshfield when the 32nd Division was activated into Federal service.

On the left of the Division's sector, MG Harding, was forced to commit his reserve (COL Herbert A. Smith's 2nd Bn., 128th Inf.) to replace the 126th Inf. (which had been detached).

"The 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry, moving forward [from Ango] toward the Triangle along the Dobodura-Buna track, new nothing of the Japanese defenses in the area and very little about the terrain. At 1330 Sgt. Irving W. Hall of Company F, leading the point, caught a swift glimpse of an enemy machine gun about fifty yards away. Coolly turning his back on the gun so as to give the impression that he had not seen it, Hall motioned his men off the track. Before the Japanese knew what he was up to he turned around and fired a burst at them from his submachine gun. In the heavy fire fight that ensued, the point suffered one casualty. Hall was later awarded the Silver Star." (Milner 182)

On the morning of 22 November, COL Tomlinson’s remaining troops passed through the Australians to attack. MAJ Boerem's detachment from 1st Bn. made a frontal attack along the trail. The 3rd Bn., with 2 companies on the left and one on the right, attempted to flank the enemy position on both sides. Company M would be the reserve. The attack made some progress at first, but soon ran into serious opposition, which halted its advance along the Sanananda Track. A Japanese counterattack was forced back, with the aid of the Australians.

The forces on the Division’s right flank (1st and 3rd Battalions of the 128th, a detachment of 1st Battalion of the 126th and one Australian independent company) were now designated 'Warren Force' and commanded by BG Hanford McNider. The units on the left were designated as 'Urbana Force', commanded by LTC Herbert A. Smith, CO 2nd Bn., 128th, and also included the 2nd Battalion of the 126th.

Further complicating an already difficult situation, these units had become split up and intermingled. This mixing of units was mainly due to transportation problems, enemy action, and interference from higher headquarters. This naturally added to the confusion and made normal administrative tasks much harder. It also had an adverse effect on morale because a unit separated from its parent organization often feels that it does not receive its share of supplies and is assigned the most undesirable tasks.

Meanwhile, there was some improvement to the supply situation now that the Dobodura airstrip was operational and four boats had been found to replace those lost to Japanese air attacks.

About this time, MG Harding asked the Australians for some light tanks; he thought they could be put to good use in the relatively open Duropa Plantation area. However, the only way to bring the tanks to the area were some captured barges, which sank when the first tanks were loaded on them.
 

From this point until the conclusion of the Battle of Buna/Sanananda, the 32nd Division was split into 3 distinct forces operating simultaneously in 3 separate sectors. In an effort to (hopefully) eliminate some confusion, a separate page will be devoted to each force to track their progress throughout the remainder of the Campaign.

At appropriate points, you will be directed to return here for information that pertains to the 32nd Division as a whole.

"The official, but perhaps incomplete, battle casualty figures by the end of November were: 82 killed in action, 85 missing in action and 325 wounded, a total of 492. These losses were not in themselves the explanation of the Division’s failure to make an effective penetration of the enemy's main line of resistance. Nonbattle casualties; physical weakness from lack of shelter, proper rations and rest; inadequate training; and possibly poor leadership at the various levels of command were more probable reasons. This last factor was now to be vigorously examined." (Blakeley 77)

Within two weeks this concept would suddenly change. The senior American and Australian leaders, including General MacArthur, felt that something needed to be done about the leadership of the 32nd Division.

"Aside from the major influence of the combat situation itself, two other factors seem to have led up to this decision. One was General Harding’s repeated attempts to get Colonel Tomlinson’s 126th Infantry returned to him or some or all of the 127th Infantry flown forward to join his command in combat. (Harding had less than half of the Division’s Infantry strength, only a few pieces of artillery and small detachments of other troops under his command at this time.) The other was his unwillingness to relieve his two force commanders, Colonels Mott and Hale. The first he thought was doing a good job although he at times antagonized 'superiors, subordinates and contemporaries.' The second, Colonel Hale, was the last of the National Guard regimental commanders still with the Division, and he had been in command of Warren Force only a week. Moreover, in Harding’s opinion Hale and his aggressive and battle-experienced executive, Lt. Col. McNab, were doing as well as could be expected with inadequate forces against a strong enemy position." (Blakeley 79-81)

"In any case, it is evident that MacArthur believed that in spite of deficiencies in training and supply, in spite of weather conditions, in spite of the high sick rate, aggressive leadership could nevertheless achieve victory in the Buna area. Whether or not he believed that it could be done without reinforcements of the troops currently engaged in the struggle is not entirely clear." (Blakeley 81)

"The basic picture, he found, was that the Japanese position in the Buna area was about 3 miles in width and relatively shallow in depth. It was all on dry land with excellent lateral communication along the beach. One flank was on the sea, which the Japanese navy controlled, and the other on unfordable streams. The concealed bunkers, connecting trenches, and cleared fields of fire constituted an excellent defensive position. The troops of the 32d, on the other hand, were in morasses which had few trails, and these were well known to the enemy." (Blakeley 83)

On 2 December, LG Eichelberger went to Urbana Force, and sent COL Gordon Rogers (I Corps G-2) and COL Clarence A. Martin (I Corps G-3 ) to Warren Force.

    "It was a long, hard day for all concerned from every point of view. Most of the travel had to be done on foot, the new arrivals were under pressure to get results, and the officers and men already on the ground felt that the newcomers had no realization of what the troops had been through or of the difficulties that they were now facing. Eichelberger was accompanied by Harding and Waldron. There were some caustic comments by Eichelberger that drew some emphatic reactions, particularly from Colonel Mott. The two colonels who visited the Warren front did not get back to Dobodura until 2200. Their reports were highly critical, and Eichelberger concluded that the day's purported attacks had had no reality on either front.
    "In spite of General MacArthur’s order to relieve the Division’s senior commanders, the new area commander had not immediately done so. Eichelberger had, certainly, been put in a peculiar position. With no warning, in fact after being told that his job was to run training in Australia - he was now primarily in command of a fraction of a division instead of a corps, and he was clearly expected to produce results no matter how ruthless he had to be. It was also unusual that he had apparently been ordered to relieve the Division commander rather than make his own decision after personal investigation on the scene. There is indeed evidence that he still felt that he had some opinion in the matter." (Blakeley 83)

"In order to avoid the creation of still another link in the already too extensive chain of command, he merged elements of Headquarters I Corps with Headquarters 32d Infantry Division under the name of Buna Force Headquarters. (Blakeley 83-4)" COL Martin became commander of both the 128th Infantry and Warren Force. Colonel John E. Grose, I Corps inspector general, became commander of Urbana Force. Colonel George DeGraaf, I Corps supply officer, was given the vital and difficult task improving the supply situation.

"While this sweeping shake-up was going on, individuals at the front were performing deeds of valor which later earned them the Distinguished Service Cross. Among them were Private John E. Combs, Captain Harold E. Hantlemann, Lieutenant James I. Hunt, and Staff Sergeant Delmar H. Daniels. (Blakeley 94)"

"Colonel Mott later contributed a touch of grim humor to an essentially tragic situation. The day he was relieved from command of Urbana Force, Mott had been told by Eichelberger that he was to be decorated with the Silver Star and the Purple Heart. Actually, Mott had not been wounded and so did not get the Purple Heart. Mott’s comment was: 'I really should have got that too since I got my throat cut.' (qtd. in Blakeley 84)"

"What were the principal factors contributing to a situation where courage was not wanting in many and yet the Division had come so close to failure that the theater commander had intervened? (Blakeley 84)" There were many contributing factors and most of them were listed on the Strategic Situation And Overview On The Eve Of The Papuan Campaign section earlier. They are repeated here, to refresh your memory and for added emphasis. "The reasons were many, but they should be examined not only in justice to the Division but as a basis for the understanding of its future successes. (Blakeley 84)"

The 32nd Division's early difficulties, like most American units early in the war, were seriously affected by the fact that America had a very small standing military before World War II. The resulting rapid military expansion necessitated by the war contributed to serious early deficiencies in leaders, weapons, equipment and training. The turnover of senior leaders and sudden influx of inexperienced, raw recruits shortly before they entered combat had been considerable. The Division's training was affected by its reorganization from a 'square' division to a 'triangular' division shortly before it entered combat. Its training was further hampered by its sudden change of mission (from Europe to the Pacific Theater) and the resulting moves related to that change. "During the period from February 1942, when General Harding took command, to the Division's entrance into combat in November, the Division was, as Harding said, 'always getting ready to move, on the move, or getting settled after a move.' (qtd. in Blakeley 84)"

In Australia, the Division's initial training was geared toward the fact that its most likely course of action would be to defend Australia against an invasion by the Japanese. When it was realized that the Division would instead carry the fight to the Japanese in the jungles of New Guinea, the needed jungle training was inhibited by lack of time and resources. Little was known about Japanese fighting techniques. Training sites and training aids for jungle training, as well as weapons and equipment adapted to jungle warfare, were inadequate or non-existant. In addition to supply and equipment shortages that seem to be common in all wars, the Southwest Pacific had the major handicap of its incredibly long supply lines. The climate and terrain in Papua could not have been worse. The unnecessarily lengthy and complex chain of command, from Gen. MacArthur, through two Australian headquarters, to the Division, was bound to cause confusion and problems.

Also, the Division was initially committed to battle with only two of its infantry regiments (one of which was subsequently taken away), and none of its organic artillery, save one howitzer, and some of its mortars. Due to the lack of artillery, the infantry soldiers at Buna were forced to reduce the sturdy Japanese bunkers with little more than grenades, and they paid a high price to do it. A few more artillery pieces, a handful of tanks committed earlier, even a few bazookas or flamethrowers, would have done much to eliminate or reduce the many difficulties facing the 32nd Division, and the Australians, in the Buna area.

    "Finally, the 32nd Division had both the honor and the handicap of being one of the first American Divisions to be tested in battle.
    "These causes, in total, resulted in heartbreak for the Division as a whole, and for General Harding and several of his senior officers. To their credit, some of them, Harding included, went to other commands and important contributions to the winning of the war. The sweeping changes in command were, of course, highly disturbing to many not directly affected.
    "It should be noted, too, in fairness to the officers and men of the Division who bore the burden of the early days of the Buna campaign, that it was not, as will be seen, until another regiment of the Division plus a reinforced brigade of veteran Australian troops was brought in that the Buna area was captured." (Blakeley 85)

"A great deal has been said and whispered about the 32nd Division, and much of it makes no sense. The 32nd which 'failed' at Buna was the same 32nd that won victory there. No one else did. Later, rejuvenated and retrained, the Division went on to establish a superior combat record in the Philippines Campaign. The 32nd originally was a Wisconsin-Michigan National Guard outfit. It went into Buna 'high' on itself, full of confidence, but quite unprepared and untrained for the miseries and terrors of jungle so alien to the experience of boys from the clipped green lawns and serene streets of the small-town Middle West. Almost all troops are afraid in battle because almost all men are afraid. That is where leadership comes in. There were men and officers who failed at Buna. But any historian will be hard put to discover in this war a division that earned, and deserved, so many citations and decorations for individual bravery. The record is there. And often beside the printed citation is the sad and significant little star which means 'Posthumous'." (Gen. Eichelberger, qtd. in Blakeley 85)

For the next two days LG Eichelberger stopped all fighting, as far as the enemy’s activities permitted, to attempt to reduce the mixing of units and attempt to fix the supply problems. He also requested the return of COL Tomlinson and his 126th Infantry headquarters from the Australian zone. Again LG Eichelberger's request was granted, while a similar request by MG Harding had been refused. MAJ Baetcke, with MAJ Zeeff as his XO, assumed command of the remaining 126th Inf. troops in the Australian zone, maintaining their hard won roadblock.

Also around this time, the 127th Infantry started to arrive at Dobodura. More good news was the arrival of five Australian Bren-gun carriers and some forty tons of food on the Warren front.

Blakeley, H. W., Major General, Retired. The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II.  The Thirty-second Infantry Division History Commission, State of Wisconsin, n.d.
Cannon, M. Hamlin.  Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954.
Drea, Edward J.  New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.
Hill, Jim Dan, Major General, Retired.  The Minute Man in Peace and War.  Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964.
Jungwirth, Clarence J.  Diary of a National Guardsman in World War II.  Oshkosh, WI: Poeschl Printing Company, 1991.
Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1957.
Papuan Campaign - The Buna-Sanananda Operation.  Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1945.
The Red Arrow - 1955 - The 32nd Division, Wisconsin National Guard.  n.p., 1955.
Smith, Herbert M., Lieutenant Colonel, Retired. Hannibal Had Elephants II.  Eau Claire, WI: Rev. William A. Heins, 1995.

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