The 32D 'Red Arrow' Veteran Association
|
|
|
|
The 32D
Infantry Division
in
World War II
The ‘Red Arrow’
Papuan Campaign - The
Battle of Buna
|
Papuan Campaign
- The Battle of Buna
"The Japanese line at Buna was, in its
way, a masterpiece. It forced the 32D Division to attack the enemy
where he was strongest . . ." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 54)
"Buna"
copyrighted image
"Honoring Those Who Have Served through Art".
A.M. Stencel
Stencel
Military Fine Art
"The basic plan of attack was
relatively simple. The objective was to destroy the enemy. The 32nd Infantry
Division and the Australian 7th Division were to attack abreast, the 32nd
Division on the right. The boundary between the divisions was to be the Girua River. Movement forward was to commence on 16
November 1942." (Blakeley 55)
On 15 November 1942 MG Harding issued Field
Order No. 1 for the operation. A battalion of the 128th would move west along
the coast to Cape Endaiadere; another would take the
Buna airfield; the remaining battalion would be the Division reserve, held near
Dobodura, where it would help the engineers prepare a
landing strip. The 126th, minus 2nd Bn. which was still a few days away, would
move to Inonda and later to Buna.
|
U.S.
Army Signal Corps photo
Soldiers
of Co. L, 3rd Bn., 128th Inf., 32nd Division, crossing footbridge between Warisota Plantation and |
U.S.
Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers
of Co. L and Co. M, 128th Inf., 32nd Division, wading across the |
Here is a map of the Buna area, 16-21 Nov. '42, from the
US Army Center of Military History web site. |
On 16 November the advance commenced
according to plan. On the coast, the 128th Infantry moved forward in two columns.
The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. McCoy)
moved up the trail toward Cape Endaiadere. The
second column, a little further inland, was 3rd Battalion (LTC Miller) followed
by 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Smith), headed for the bridge
between the air strips near Buna Mission. On the left of the Division’s zone,
Colonel Tomlinson's 126th Infantry (minus the 2nd Bn. which was near the end of
its march over the Owen Stanleys) moved out from Bofu toward Inonda and Buna.
"On the other side of the Girua, to the left of the 32d Division, the Australian
infantry also started its advance. The fight for Buna had begun with both the
Americans and Australians anticipating an easy victory. (Blakeley 56)"
At 1845 on 16 November, 18 Japanese Zeros
attacked the 32nd Division's supply boats off Cape Sudest
(about 8 or 10 miles SE of Buna). These small boats were carrying ammunition,
rations, radio supplies, 81mm mortars, .50 caliber machine guns, and equipment
and personnel of the 22nd Portable Hospital. Also on board where MG Harding, BG
Waldron, COL McKenny, and two Army Ground Forces
observers – Colonel’s Harold F. Handy and Herbert B. Laux.
The soldiers tried to fend off the Zeros with small arms fire, but they were
unsuccessful. Soon the boats were burning and everyone was forced into the
water when the ammunition started to explode. The two generals were among those
who made it to shore, but COL McKenny and 23 others
were killed and many others wounded. COL McKenny was
succeeded by Major Ralph T. Birkeness as Division
quartermaster. "Ten participants
were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross: Colonel John J. Carew,
114th Engineer Battalion; Lieutenant John E. Harbert,
Ordnance; Lieutenant Herbert G. Peabody, Division Headquarters Company; Staff
Sergeant John R. MacGowan, Sergeant Howard J. Weiss,
Corporal Gordon C. Snyder and Private Cloyd G. Myers
of the 128th Infantry; Private First Class Donald R. Price, Privates Maro P. Johnson and Homer W. MacAllister
of the 107th Quartermaster Battalion. (Blakeley
60)"
The next morning the Japanese knocked two of the
three remaining boats out of commission. A crucial and irreplaceable supply
link had been crippled; there were no other boats available. The weapons,
equipment and supplies lost would soon be sorely missed. These same boats were
also supposed to transport some of the Division's troops waiting at Pongani (about 25 miles from Buna),
those units now faced an arduous trip on foot. The G4, LTC Joseph Sladen Bradley, and the rest of the Division, would now be
even more dependent on the Army Air Force for resupply.
Somewhere around this time, one gun
of Battery A, 129th Field Artillery, arrived at Dobodura.
"The 105mm howitzer of Battery A, 129th Field Artillery Battalion was loaded in a B-17 in Brisbane and flown to Port Moresby, together with a gun crew of eight men, equipment and 200 rounds of ammunition. Later it took three C-47 transport planes to carry the same load over the Owen-Stanley Mountains. The transports landed at Dobodura. Here the gun was assembled and Lieutenant Colonel Melvin McCreary immediately selected a position. After the gun was pulled up the trail a short distance northwest of Ango, 2d Lieutenant Herbert H. Jackson and his men commenced firing. The gun never left this position until the end of the Buna Campaign. The reason for not shifting was (1) positions were not available because of the terrain and (2) most of the 32d Division front was within range of the position occupied by the gun. It was the only American field piece brought up to support the 32d Infantry Division during the Papuan Campaign. Conditions for the Australians was much the same; only eight guns of various calibers were brought into action west of the Girua River." (Blakeley 67)
On 19 November the attack commenced. It rained heavily all
day; no aircraft could get off the ground. Fresh Japanese reinforcements had
arrived from Rabaul on the 16th and 17th; these were now in the area that the
128th Infantry was poised to attack. The 1st Battalion (LTC McCoy) set out from
Boreo and 3rd Battalion (LTC Miller) from Simemi. The 2nd Battalion, the Division reserve, was
located at Ango and Dobodura.
Those at Dobodura were helping the engineers to
complete the airfield, which was now even more vital after the the loss of the supply boats.
The 1st Bn., 128th made enemy contact 700 yards
from Boreo, near the Duropa
Plantation.
"It was met at that point by heavy machine gun and rifle fire from hidden enemy machine gun positions west of the track. The troops deployed and attacked, but the heavy overhead jungle growth made it difficult for them to use their mortars effectively and their grenades were of little use because they did not know where the enemy was or where the fire was coming from. The Japanese weapons gave off no flash, and the reverberation of their fire in the jungle made it impossible to ascertain their whereabouts by sound. To complicate matters, the Japanese made it a practice to rotate their weapons among several hidden positions, causing the inexperienced Americans, until they saw through the trick, to imagine themselves covered by automatic weapons from all sides." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 61)
A medic, T/5 Edwin C. De Rosier, repeatedly exposed himself to the
intense enemy fire in order to aid the wounded, saving several lives. "Killed
in action two weeks later, De Rosier was posthumously awarded the Distinguished
Service Cross. (Blakeley 61)"
"Out of rations, and with a greater part of its ammunition
used up, the 1st battalion ended the day a badly shaken outfit. The troops had
entered the battle joking and laughing, and sure of an easy victory. Now they
were dazed and taken aback by the mauling they had received at the hands of the
Japanese. Nor did it escape them that the bodies of the few Japanese left on
the field were those of fresh, well-fed, well-armed troops - not, as they had
been led to expect, the tired, emaciated, and disease-ridden survivors of the fighting
in the Owen Stanleys. It was to be sometime before
they and their fellows recovered from the shock of finding that the battle was
to be no push-over, and that, instead of a short and easy mop-up, a long cruel
fight lay ahead of them." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 61)
"Colonel Miller's troops had an even ruder awakening. As the 3d Battalion approached the trail junction between the Old and New Strips, the Simemi Trail degenerated into a narrow causeway with swamp on either side. Attempts to get the troops through an open area about 300 yards south of the junction were met with such intense fire from the western end of the New Strip, from behind the bridge between the strips, and from machine guns forward of the junction itself that no further advance was possible that day.
"Nor could Miller do much to blast out the enemy with fire. He had no 81mm mortars; most of the machine-gun cartridges he had with him were found to be of the wrong type, a large percentage of his grenades failed to go off; and he quickly ran out of .30-caliber ammunition and had to call for a fresh supply to be dropped to him from the air." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 61-2)
Also on 19 November, COL Tomlinson (126th Inf.) sent MAJ
Bond with Cos. I & K to establish contact with the 7th
Australian Division on the other side of the Girua
River, because they had been unable to make radio contact. They located
the Australians at Popondetta then went back to Inonda. From there the 126th (minus 1st Bn., which was with
the 128th) Infantry continued its march toward Buna.
20 November
showed little improvement for the 128th Infantry. The 1st Bn. was able to gain
200 yards; the 3rd Bn. went nowhere. 1LT. John W. Crow, who heroically led Co.
C in knocking out several machine guns, was reported missing in action that
day.
"Lieutenant Crow, last seen charging an enemy machine gun post, submachine gun in hand, was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross." (Milner 176)
Late in the day both battalions received much-needed rations and
ammo; these were dropped at Hariko and Simemi. More troops also arrived, in the form of 1st
Battalion, 126th Infantry, after completing an
strenuous cross-country trek from Pongani.
As if things weren't already difficult enough for
the 32nd Division, the situation was about to get worse. General Blamey, the
New Guinea Force commander, with General MacArthur’s consent, decided to take
the 126th Infantry away from MG Harding and give it to General Vassey, commander of the Australian 7th Division. The
Australians weren't making any more progress than the 32nd was. Higher
headquarters somehow thought that this was because "there seemed to
be more Japanese in General Vassey’s area than in
General Harding’s (Victory in Papua, qtd. in
Blakeley 65)" So they decided "that the main
effort would therefore have to be made west of the Girua
River. (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 65)"
MG Harding, rightly upset about the impending loss
of half of his available combat power, just as the battle for Buna was getting
underway; sent a message "'For General Herring's eyes only,' he
urged that the decision to take the 126th Infantry away from him be
reconsidered as likely to lead to confusion, resentment, and misunderstanding.
(Blakeley 65)" General Herring's gruff response was, "the
decision would have to stand, and that he was counting on Harding to make no
more difficulties in the matter. (Blakeley 65)"
On 21 November, the 126th
Infantry (minus detachments), along with a platoon from Co. A, 114th Engineer Bn. and some medical attachments,
arrived at Soputa and were assigned to Brigadier
Lloyd, commander of the Australian 16th Brigade.
"While the bulk of the troops in the
32nd Division’s left zone was being moved out of it,
things were not going well on the right.
(Blakeley 66)" A 0800 attack by the 1st and 3rd of the 128th
and 1st of the 126th (-) did not go off because the commanders didn’t receive
the attack orders until ¾ of an hour after H-hour. Air support for the attack
arrived on schedule; but some of the bombs fell short,
causing casualties in the 3rd of the 128th.
So General Harding rescheduled his attack for
1300. The infantry attack was to be preceded by a 1245 air attack, but no planes
arrived. General Harding made another attempt for a coordinated attack, with
air support.
"The air attack, by A-20s and B-25s, came in around 1600; it was not a success. Most of the planes could not find the target area; one flight dropped its bombs in the sea, and one B-25 got a direct hit on Companies B and C of the 128th, killing six, wounding twelve, and seriously affecting the will to fight of the whole battalion. The Japanese positions were virtually untouched and the attacks against them were easily repulsed with heavy casualties." (Blakeley 66)
"The troops along the coastal track fought desperately with rifles, Thompson submachine guns, light machine guns, and hand grenades. They knocked out a few machine gun nests during the day, as did the Australian Independant Company which was operating near the eastern end of the strip. Otherwise there was little progress. Casualties were heavy. In three days of combat, Company C [128th Inf.] lost sixty-three men, including all four of its officers. Two sergeants, killed within a few hours of each other, commanded it on the 21st. The two sergeants, 1SG Reuben J. Steger, and SSG Carl [J.] Cherney, both from Marshfield, Wisconsin, were posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross." (Milner 178) Company C, 128th Infantry was from Marshfield when the 32nd Division was activated into Federal service.
A decision was made that night to break off 3rd Battalion's
attack. Company I (Lt. Carl K. Fryday) was left in
place to retain the ground that had been taken. The rest of the Battalion was
moved to the right flank (with 1st Bn., 128th Inf.).
On the left of the Division's sector, MG Harding,
was forced to commit his reserve (COL Herbert A. Smith's 2nd Bn., 128th Inf.)
to replace the 126th Inf. (which had been detached).
"The 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry, moving forward [from Ango] toward the Triangle along the Dobodura-Buna track, new nothing of the Japanese defenses in the area and very little about the terrain. At 1330 Sgt. Irving W. Hall of Company F, leading the point, caught a swift glimpse of an enemy machine gun about fifty yards away. Coolly turning his back on the gun so as to give the impression that he had not seen it, Hall motioned his men off the track. Before the Japanese knew what he was up to he turned around and fired a burst at them from his submachine gun. In the heavy fire fight that ensued, the point suffered one casualty. Hall was later awarded the Silver Star." (Milner 182)
This battalion was hastily thrown in and soon needed help. So MG
Harding pleaded for the return of at least one of his battalions. General
Herring consented, the 2nd Bn., 126th was sent back across the river. It was
late on 22 November before they could get across the flooded river on
improvised rafts.
On the morning of 22 November, COL
Tomlinson’s remaining troops passed through the Australians to attack. MAJ Boerem's detachment from 1st Bn. made a frontal attack
along the trail. The 3rd Bn., with 2 companies on the left and one on the
right, attempted to flank the enemy position on both sides. Company M would be
the reserve. The attack made some progress at first, but soon ran into serious
opposition, which halted its advance along the Sanananda Track. A Japanese
counterattack was forced back, with the aid of the Australians.
The forces on the Division’s right flank (1st and
3rd Battalions of the 128th, a detachment of 1st Battalion of the 126th and one
Australian independent company) were now designated 'Warren Force' and
commanded by BG Hanford McNider. The units on the
left were designated as 'Urbana Force', commanded by LTC Herbert A. Smith, CO
2nd Bn., 128th, and also included the 2nd Battalion of the 126th.
Further complicating an already difficult
situation, these units had become split up and intermingled. This mixing of
units was mainly due to transportation problems, enemy action, and interference
from higher headquarters. This naturally added to the confusion and made normal
administrative tasks much harder. It also had an adverse effect on morale
because a unit separated from its parent organization often feels that it does
not receive its share of supplies and is assigned the most undesirable tasks.
Meanwhile, there was some improvement to the
supply situation now that the Dobodura airstrip was
operational and four boats had been found to replace those lost to Japanese air
attacks.
About this time, MG Harding asked the Australians
for some light tanks; he thought they could be put to good use in the
relatively open Duropa Plantation area. However, the
only way to bring the tanks to the area were some
captured barges, which sank when the first tanks were loaded on them.
From this point until the conclusion of the Battle of Buna/Sanananda, the 32nd Division was split into 3 distinct forces operating simultaneously in 3 separate sectors. In an effort to (hopefully) eliminate some confusion, a separate page will be devoted to each force to track their progress throughout the remainder of the Campaign.
Warren
Force
Urbana
Force
32nd Div.
troops in the Australian Zone
At appropriate points, you will be directed to return here for information that pertains to the 32nd Division as a whole.
"The official, but perhaps incomplete, battle casualty figures by the end of November were: 82 killed in action, 85 missing in action and 325 wounded, a total of 492. These losses were not in themselves the explanation of the Division’s failure to make an effective penetration of the enemy's main line of resistance. Nonbattle casualties; physical weakness from lack of shelter, proper rations and rest; inadequate training; and possibly poor leadership at the various levels of command were more probable reasons. This last factor was now to be vigorously examined." (Blakeley 77)
During November of 1942, Lieutenant General Eichelberger had made an attempt to visit the 32nd Division
and see them in action. He wanted to see how they were doing because they would
probably rejoin his I Corps eventually. He was also seeking information about
the Japanese fighting methods to incorporate into training programs for other
U.S. troops assembling in Australia. When he reached Port Moresby, he was told
by General Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, that
he was to immediately return to Australia. According to LG Eichelberger,
Gen. Sutherland explicitly clarified the role of I Corps: "My
officers and I were not headed for combat; our job was to train troops; and the
training role would be ours from then on. (qtd.
in Blakeley 79)"
Within two weeks this concept would suddenly
change. The senior American and Australian leaders, including General
MacArthur, felt that something needed to be done about the leadership of the
32nd Division.
"Aside from the major influence of the combat situation itself, two other factors seem to have led up to this decision. One was General Harding’s repeated attempts to get Colonel Tomlinson’s 126th Infantry returned to him or some or all of the 127th Infantry flown forward to join his command in combat. (Harding had less than half of the Division’s Infantry strength, only a few pieces of artillery and small detachments of other troops under his command at this time.) The other was his unwillingness to relieve his two force commanders, Colonels Mott and Hale. The first he thought was doing a good job although he at times antagonized 'superiors, subordinates and contemporaries.' The second, Colonel Hale, was the last of the National Guard regimental commanders still with the Division, and he had been in command of Warren Force only a week. Moreover, in Harding’s opinion Hale and his aggressive and battle-experienced executive, Lt. Col. McNab, were doing as well as could be expected with inadequate forces against a strong enemy position." (Blakeley 79-81)
General MacArthur ordered LG Eichelberger
to Port Moresby immediately. He arrived in Port Moresby on 30 November 1942,
accompanied by his chief of staff, BG Clovis E. Byers, and several other I
Corps officers and enlisted men. He reported to General MacArthur for
instructions, which were reportedly highly dramatic. LG Eichelberger
quoted Gen. MacArthur as saying, “Bob, I want you to take Buna, or not
come back alive, and that goes for your chief of staff too! (qtd. in
Blakeley 81)” LG Eichelberger was given
a free hand to do whatever he deemed necessary to complete the mission, even to
the extent of relieving General Harding, as well as other commanders.
"In any case, it is evident that MacArthur believed that in
spite of deficiencies in training and supply, in spite of weather conditions,
in spite of the high sick rate, aggressive leadership could nevertheless
achieve victory in the Buna area. Whether or not he believed that it could be
done without reinforcements of the troops currently engaged in the struggle is
not entirely clear." (Blakeley 81)
On 1 December 1942, LG Eichelberger
arrived at Dobodura and assumed command of all U.S.
troops in the area. The remainder of the day consisted of conferences with MG
Harding and other officers.
"The basic picture, he found, was that the Japanese position
in the Buna area was about 3 miles in width and relatively shallow in depth. It
was all on dry land with excellent lateral communication along the beach. One
flank was on the sea, which the Japanese navy controlled, and the other on unfordable streams. The concealed bunkers, connecting
trenches, and cleared fields of fire constituted an excellent defensive
position. The troops of the 32d, on the other hand, were in morasses which had
few trails, and these were well known to the enemy." (Blakeley 83)
General Eichelberger immediately
requested (just like MG Harding had recently attempted) that Gen. MacArthur's
headquarters send at least one battalion of the 127th Infantry forward. For
some reason LG Eichelberger's request was granted
while MG Harding's had been ignored; the whole regiment was soon on the way.
On 2 December, LG Eichelberger
went to Urbana Force, and sent COL Gordon Rogers (I Corps G-2) and COL Clarence
A. Martin (I Corps G-3 ) to Warren Force.
"It was a long, hard day for all concerned from every point of view. Most of the travel had to be done on foot, the new arrivals were under pressure to get results, and the officers and men already on the ground felt that the newcomers had no realization of what the troops had been through or of the difficulties that they were now facing. Eichelberger was accompanied by Harding and Waldron. There were some caustic comments by Eichelberger that drew some emphatic reactions, particularly from Colonel Mott. The two colonels who visited the Warren front did not get back to Dobodura until 2200. Their reports were highly critical, and Eichelberger concluded that the day's purported attacks had had no reality on either front.
"In spite of General MacArthur’s order to relieve the Division’s senior commanders, the new area commander had not immediately done so. Eichelberger had, certainly, been put in a peculiar position. With no warning, in fact after being told that his job was to run training in Australia - he was now primarily in command of a fraction of a division instead of a corps, and he was clearly expected to produce results no matter how ruthless he had to be. It was also unusual that he had apparently been ordered to relieve the Division commander rather than make his own decision after personal investigation on the scene. There is indeed evidence that he still felt that he had some opinion in the matter." (Blakeley 83)
LG Eichelberger did recognize two things
that needed to be done right away. Improve the supply situation and attempt to unmix the units. He also started making some command
changes. General Harding was relieved and General Waldron was placed in command
of the Division, Colonel Melvin L. McCreary then became Division Artillery
commander. COL McCreary had been an Army Instructor assigned to the 128th Inf.,
Wisconsin National Guard, in the late 1920's and 1930's.
"In order to avoid the creation of
still another link in the already too extensive chain of command, he merged
elements of Headquarters I Corps with Headquarters 32d Infantry Division under
the name of Buna Force Headquarters.
(Blakeley 83-4)" COL Martin became commander of both the
128th Infantry and Warren Force. Colonel John E. Grose,
I Corps inspector general, became commander of Urbana Force. Colonel George DeGraaf, I Corps supply officer, was given the vital and
difficult task improving the supply situation.
"While this sweeping shake-up was
going on, individuals at the front were performing deeds of valor which later
earned them the Distinguished Service Cross. Among them were Private John E.
Combs, Captain Harold E. Hantlemann, Lieutenant James
I. Hunt, and Staff Sergeant Delmar H. Daniels. (Blakeley 94)"
"Colonel Mott later contributed a touch of grim humor to an essentially tragic situation. The day he was relieved from command of Urbana Force, Mott had been told by Eichelberger that he was to be decorated with the Silver Star and the Purple Heart. Actually, Mott had not been wounded and so did not get the Purple Heart. Mott’s comment was: 'I really should have got that too since I got my throat cut.' (qtd. in Blakeley 84)"
"What were the principal factors contributing to a situation where
courage was not wanting in many and yet the Division had come so close to
failure that the theater commander had intervened? (Blakeley 84)"
There were many contributing factors and most of them were listed on the Strategic
Situation And Overview On The Eve Of The Papuan
Campaign section earlier. They are repeated here, to refresh your memory
and for added emphasis. "The reasons were many, but they should be
examined not only in justice to the Division but as a basis for the
understanding of its future successes. (Blakeley 84)"
The 32nd Division's early difficulties, like most
American units early in the war, were seriously affected by the fact that
America had a very small standing military before World War II. The resulting
rapid military expansion necessitated by the war contributed to serious early
deficiencies in leaders, weapons, equipment and training. The turnover of
senior leaders and sudden influx of inexperienced, raw recruits shortly before
they entered combat had been considerable. The Division's training was affected
by its reorganization from a 'square' division to a 'triangular' division
shortly before it entered combat. Its training was further hampered by its
sudden change of mission (from Europe to the Pacific Theater) and the resulting
moves related to that change. "During the period from February 1942,
when General Harding took command, to the Division's entrance into combat in
November, the Division was, as Harding said, 'always getting ready to move,
on the move, or getting settled after a move.' (qtd.
in Blakeley 84)"
In Australia, the Division's initial training was
geared toward the fact that its most likely course of action would be to defend
Australia against an invasion by the Japanese. When it was realized that the
Division would instead carry the fight to the Japanese in the jungles of New
Guinea, the needed jungle training was inhibited by lack of time and resources.
Little was known about Japanese fighting techniques. Training sites and
training aids for jungle training, as well as weapons and equipment adapted to
jungle warfare, were inadequate or non-existant. In
addition to supply and equipment shortages that seem to be common in all wars,
the Southwest Pacific had the major handicap of its incredibly long supply
lines. The climate and terrain in Papua could not have been worse. The
unnecessarily lengthy and complex chain of command, from Gen. MacArthur,
through two Australian headquarters, to the Division, was bound to cause
confusion and problems.
Also, the Division was initially committed to
battle with only two of its infantry regiments (one of which was subsequently
taken away), and none of its organic artillery, save one howitzer, and some of
its mortars. Due to the lack of artillery, the infantry soldiers at Buna were
forced to reduce the sturdy Japanese bunkers with little more than grenades,
and they paid a high price to do it. A few more artillery pieces, a handful of
tanks committed earlier, even a few bazookas or flamethrowers, would have done
much to eliminate or reduce the many difficulties facing the 32nd Division, and
the Australians, in the Buna area.
"Finally, the 32nd Division had both the honor and the handicap of being one of the first American Divisions to be tested in battle.
"These causes, in total, resulted in heartbreak for the Division as a whole, and for General Harding and several of his senior officers. To their credit, some of them, Harding included, went to other commands and important contributions to the winning of the war. The sweeping changes in command were, of course, highly disturbing to many not directly affected.
"It should be noted, too, in fairness to the officers and men of the Division who bore the burden of the early days of the Buna campaign, that it was not, as will be seen, until another regiment of the Division plus a reinforced brigade of veteran Australian troops was brought in that the Buna area was captured." (Blakeley 85)
You should bear in mind that the 32nd Division, during this
difficult time at Buna, was writing the book for combat against the Japanese in
the jungles of the Pacific with their sweat and blood. All of the Pacific
battles yet to come were able to benefit from the lessons learned by the 32nd
Division at Buna, and also the Marines and Army Infantry concurrently fighting
at Guadalcanal.
"A great deal has been said and whispered about the 32nd
Division, and much of it makes no sense. The 32nd which 'failed' at Buna was
the same 32nd that won victory there. No one else did. Later, rejuvenated and
retrained, the Division went on to establish a superior combat record in the
Philippines Campaign. The 32nd originally was a Wisconsin-Michigan National
Guard outfit. It went into Buna 'high' on itself, full of confidence, but quite
unprepared and untrained for the miseries and terrors of jungle so alien to the
experience of boys from the clipped green lawns and serene streets of the
small-town Middle West. Almost all troops are afraid in battle because almost
all men are afraid. That is where leadership comes in. There were men and
officers who failed at Buna. But any historian will be hard put to discover in
this war a division that earned, and deserved, so many citations and
decorations for individual bravery. The record is there. And often beside the
printed citation is the sad and significant little star which means
'Posthumous'." (Gen. Eichelberger, qtd. in Blakeley
85)
"Eichelberger goes on to say that
to understand the 32d, one must remember what it had gone through in its first
weeks in Papua, and how quickly the men were riddled with malaria, dengue
fever, tropical dysentery, and covered with jungle ulcers. Soon after he
arrived at the front, he had the temperatures of the men of one company taken,
and every member was running a fever. (Blakeley 85-7)"
For the next two days LG Eichelberger
stopped all fighting, as far as the enemy’s activities permitted, to attempt to
reduce the mixing of units and attempt to fix the supply problems. He also
requested the return of COL Tomlinson and his 126th Infantry headquarters from
the Australian zone. Again LG Eichelberger's request
was granted, while a similar request by MG Harding had been refused. MAJ Baetcke, with MAJ Zeeff as his
XO, assumed command of the remaining 126th Inf. troops in the Australian zone,
maintaining their hard won roadblock.
Also around this time, the 127th Infantry started
to arrive at Dobodura. More good news was the arrival
of five Australian Bren-gun carriers and some forty tons of food on the Warren
front.
At this
point you should return to the separate pages for the different forces.
Warren
Force
Urbana
Force
32nd
Div. troops in the Australian Zone
Next Section - Papuan Campaign
- The Battle of Sanananda
Bibliography (primary sources for historical
information regarding the 32D ‘The Red Arrow’ Infantry Division’s
exploits during World War II):
Blakeley, H. W., Major General, Retired. The 32D Infantry Division in World War II.
The Thirty-second Infantry Division History Commission, State of Wisconsin, n.d.
Cannon,
M. Hamlin. Leyte: The
Return to the Philippines.
U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1954.
Drea,
Edward J. Defending
the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984.
Drea,
Edward J. New
Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II.
U. S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.
Hill,
Jim Dan, Major General, Retired. The Minute Man in
Peace and War. Harrisburg: The Stackpole
Company, 1964.
Jungwirth,
Clarence J. Diary of a National Guardsman in World
War II. Oshkosh, WI: Poeschl
Printing Company, 1991.
Milner,
Samuel. Victory
in Papua.
U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1957.
Papuan
Campaign - The Buna-Sanananda Operation.
Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1945.
The Red Arrow - 1955 - The 32D Division, Wisconsin
National Guard.
n.p.,
1955.
Smith,
Herbert M., Lieutenant Colonel, Retired. Hannibal Had Elephants II.
Eau Claire, WI: Rev. William A. Heins, 1995.
Smith, Robert Ross. The
Approach to the Philippines.
U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1953.
Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph
in the Philippines.
U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1963.
Back to 32D
Division in World War II
Contact the 32D 'Red Arrow'
Veteran Association Webmaster.
revised 14 May 2012
since 12 July 1999