The 32nd 'Red Arrow' Veteran Association
	The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II "The Red Arrow" Part 2 Overview on the Eve of the Papuan Campaign The Papuan Campaign - The Advance to Buna

Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32nd Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the 'Red Arrow's' 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32nd Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book.

The western drive was attempted in order to gain control of southeastern New Guinea, especially the Papuan capital of Port Moresby, which would put them in striking distance of Australia and would strengthen their defenses in the Southwest Pacific. The Japanese defeat during the Battle of the Coral Sea halted their effort to capture Port Moresby by sea. Undaunted, the Japanese landed troops at Buna, Gona and Sanananda on the northeast coast of Papua in July and pushed southward across the Papuan peninsula toward Port Moresby.

Control of the north coast of New Guinea was also vital to future Allied strategy. Taking it from the Japanese would remove the threat of an attack on Australia and would reduce the threat to the Allied supply line from America. Air bases established on New Guinea would increase the reach of Allied planes. From these bases, the Allies could threaten the center of Japanese power in the Southwest Pacific, Rabaul.

Before you read of the 32nd Division's experiences and victory in the Papuan Campaign, it is important that you become aware of the many variables which contributed directly to the Division's performance. As you will soon read, the early stages of the campaign did not go well. But you will later read that the Division eventually prevailed, by overcoming the multitude of challenges that it faced through the tremendous sacrifices, shear determination and conspicuous bravery its soldiers.

The 32nd Division's early difficulties, like most American units early in the war, were partly the result of the fact that America had a very small standing military before World War II. The resulting rapid military expansion necessitated by the war contributed to serious early deficiencies in leaders, weapons, equipment and training. The turnover of senior leaders and sudden influx of inexperienced, raw recruits had been considerable. The Division's training was adversely affected by its reorganization from a 'square' division to a 'triangular' division shortly before it entered combat. Its training was further hampered by its sudden change of mission (from Europe to the Pacific Theater) and the resulting moves related to that change. During the period from February 1942, when General Harding took command, to the Division's entrance into combat in November, the Division was, as Harding said, "always getting ready to move, on the move, or getting settled after a move. (qtd. in Blakeley 84)"

In Australia, the Division's initial training was geared toward the fact that its most likely course of action would be to defend Australia against an invasion by the Japanese. When it was realized that the Division would instead carry the fight to the Japanese in the jungles of New Guinea, the needed jungle training was inhibited by lack of time and resources. Little was known about Japanese fighting techniques. Training sites and training aids for jungle training, as well as weapons and equipment adapted to jungle warfare, were inadequate or non-existant. In addition to supply and equipment shortages that seem to be common in all wars, the Southwest Pacific had the major handicap of its incredibly long supply lines. The chain of command, from MacArthur, through two Australian headquarters, to the Division, was the cause of some problems.

Also, the Division was initially committed to battle with only two of its infantry regiments (one of which was subsequently taken away), and none of its organic artillery, save one howitzer, and some of its mortars. "The artillery at the disposal of the 32nd Division during the campaign never exceeded eight Australian guns of various light calibers and one 105 mm American howitzer. (Blakeley 56)" These few artillery pieces had to support the Australian forces as well as the 32nd Division.

The climate and terrain in Papua could not have been worse. The terrain around Buna was swampy and flat. Most of the area consisted of incredibly dense vegetation which was a considerable obstacle not only to movement, but also observation, communications (wire and radio), fire (both direct and indirect), air support, supply, and evacuation. The climate of the area was wet, hot and humid. The rainy season was just beginning; the rivers were deeper, wider and faster than normal and the swamps were wetter than normal as well. All of the tropical diseases prevalent in this type of environment flourished, including malaria, dengue fever, dysentery, athlete’s foot, ringworm and others. Effective medicine to prevent and treat these diseases were not readily available.

Another issue that would have a direct impact on the Division was the inaccurate information available about the disposition of the Japanese forces. The natives provided the Division G2 with information that led him to believe the Japanese garrison at Buna was about a battalion. The Army Air Forces found no signs of the Japanese or their defensive positions. General MacArthur's headquarters also seriously underestimated the strength and effectiveness of the enemy at Buna. Based on what they had been told, the belief in the 32nd Division was that Buna could be captured easily.

As was soon learned, at great cost, the Japanese had a well prepared position extending for over ten miles along the coast. It consisted of three main defensive groups at Gona, Sanananda and Buna. The Japanese were able to use the open beach for rapid communication between these groups. The attackers had to struggle through impenetrable jungles and swamps. The American and Australian attacks were highly canalized on narrow fronts because there were few trails through the swamps and jungle. The Japanese were very familiar with these few and poor avenues of approach, so they were well covered by fire from well prepared, mutually supporting positions. These positions were solidly constructed, to include effective overhead cover, from heavy logs, and steel oil drums filled with sand. Some positions were made of concrete and steel. They were all excellently camouflaged; the fast growing jungle vegetation made them nearly invisible.

Best estimates suggest a force of about 6,500 Japanese in the Buna area in mid-November, of these about 1,000 were fresh reinforcements from Rabaul. Aside from the fresh troops, the Japanese were not in great shape. They consisted of fragments of several different army, navy and marine units, making their organization problematic. Many were sick or exhausted. Weapons, food and medical supplies were in short supply, but stocks of ammunition were adequate. Despite these hardships, and aided by their advantageous defensive positions, they still possessed the will and the capability of putting up a strong fight.

"More important still was the fact that for most men concerned it was their first experience under fire. No training, no tests, no personal evaluations quite equal to the first trial by fire. It is a painful definitive shakedown for every unit. Often the unexpected happens. A loud-mouthed, aggressive leader folds up; a quite, unimpressive man becomes a natural leader; and sometimes the braggart makes good and the timid man becomes more timid . . . the unit will never again be as unstable as it was during its first fight." (Blakeley 55)

This decision was due (at least in part) to the fact that by 14 September the tired Australian militia units had been pushed back to within thirty-two miles of Port Moresby (most of Australia's Army was fighting the Germans in North Africa at this time). These militia units had been fighting the Japanese since they had landed at Buna, Gona and Sanananda in July. The blunt reality was that soldiers were urgently needed on the Papuan Peninsula. Even though the 32nd Division wasn't ready to go; they were the only division available. (The 41st Infantry Division was assembling in Australia at this time, but the entire Division was not on the ground yet.)

Two regimental combat teams (RCT) of the 32nd were designated for initial deployment to New Guinea, the 126th (COL Lawrence A. Quinn) and 128th (COL J. Tracy Hale). Each infantry regiment was joined by a platoon of the 114th Engineers, a collecting company and a platoon from the clearing company of the 107th Medical Battalion, and a detachment of the 32nd Signal Company. The infantry howitzers, most of the 81 mm mortars and the battalion of Divisional field artillery normally part of a RCT were left in Australia due to the difficulties of transporting them to New Guinea. Major General George C. Kenney, commander of the 5th Air Force, suggested that he could fly the first regiment in because the situation was critical and time was short. This sort of thing had not been attempted before, so one company would be used as a test to see how it would work.

At dawn on 15 September, Company E, 126th Infantry, commanded by CPT Melvin Schultz, was the first unit to take off from Amberly Field in Brisbane for the 1,000 mile flight to Port Moresby. It was accompanied by a platoon of Company A, 114th Engineers, and a small medical detachment, commanded by CPT John T. Boet. "In the rush of getting ready on short notice, there was not time to get the fatigue uniforms which had been sprayed with green camouflage dye thoroughly dried, and they were dried out on the men's backs as they flew north" (Blakeley 36).

"Because this company was the leading element of the 126th, and that regiment was, in turn, the leading unit of the Division, General Harding told the men of the company that they were 'the spearhead of the spearhead of the spearhead.' Thereafter Company E proudly called itself 'The Three Spearheads'." (Blakeley 36)

NEW Photo added 1 Aug. 04 U.S. Army Signal Corps photo An Australian sentry guards an American Boeing B-17 in the early morning as soldiers of the 128th Inf., 32nd Division, wait in the distance to board a plane for New Guinea at Amberly Field, Ipswich, Australia, on 18 September 1942.

"The Liberty Ship, Benjamin Franklin, anchored in the harbor at Port Moresby, Papua, New Guinea, on the afternoon of Monday, September 28, 1942. Aboard was the 2nd Battalion, 126th Inf. (2/126), (less Co. E) and an Aussie Tank Co. Due to limited dock space, the troops were ferried ashore by an Aussie corvette. The 2/126 joined Co. E at Bootless Bay where they bivouacked." (Smith 1)

"The 128th was already opening a road in the Goldie River Valley, and Captain [William F.] Boice [Division S-2] with Lieutenant Bernard Howes, six men from Company E of the 126th, and some forty natives, had begun a reconnaissance of the trail from Kapa Kapa toward Jaure." (Blakeley 40)

The remainder of the 32nd Division Headquarters, minus a rear detachment, arrived in Port Moresby by air on the 29 September.

"General MacArthur and the Australian commander of New Guinea Force, (Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey) decided that while the Australians were driving the Japanese back along the Kokoda Trail, the 32nd Division would make a wide envelopment to the east and attack the enemy’s left flank in the vicinity of Buna. The initial plan was to march the entire Division over the mountains, but both Kenney and Harding argued for an air movement to insure speed and avoid dissipating the strength of the Division by marching it across the exhausting mountain trails. The plan, as finally adopted, provided that most of the enveloping force was to go by air to the seacoast southeast of Buna." (Blakeley 40) The straight-line distance from Port Moresby to Buna is 120 miles, but between them lies the 13,000 foot Owen Stanley mountain range.

The 2nd Battalion, 126th Infantry, was designated for the grueling mission of protecting the right flank of the Australians, by marching over the Owen Stanley Mountains on the Kapa Kapa Trail.

On 6 October 1942 an advance detachment started out from Kalikadobu to set up air drop zones along the Kapa Kapa – Dobodura Trail at Laruni and Jaure. Kalikadobu was nicknamed Kalamazoo by the 126th Inf. (a reference to their home state of Michigan). This detachment was commanded by Captain Alfred Medendorp and consisted of the 126th‘s Antitank and Cannon Companies (functioning as infantry, their artillery was left in Australia) plus 100 natives.

On 7 October a detachment from Co. E was added to CPT Medendorp's force. This new detachment included a five-man communications team commanded by Lt. James G. Downer and a 40-man rifle platoon led by Lt. Harold B. Chandler, Jr.

The remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 126th Infantry, started out on 14 October, with Company E (CPT Schultz) leading, followed by Co. F (Lt. Erwin Nummer). The rest of the companies followed at one day intervals. General Harding's advance headquarters was at Kalamazoo at this time. The 3rd (and part of the 1st) Battalion of the 126th would later be flown to Pongani. The remainder of 1st Battalion was flown to Abel’s Field in the upper Musa Valley, where they then had a difficult march through the swamp to Pongani.

Meanwhile the 128th Infantry was flown to Wanigela Mission on Collingswood Bay, 65 miles southeast of Buna. Most of the regiment completed this move on 14-18 October, with LTC Kelsie E. Miller's 3rd Battalion as the lead element. The plan was that the 128th would march to Pongani, about 25 miles from Buna, with the 6th Independent Company (Australian) leading the way. BG Hanford MacNider, a recent arrival in the 32nd Div., was placed in command of this task force.

On 14 October, the Australians set out, traveling lightly, to blaze the trail. They discovered that the Musa River was in flood, and still rising. As a result, most of the trails in the area were unusable, but they were able to struggle to Pongani. The 128th Infantry had a tougher time.

    "The heavily loaded 3d Battalion, though only a day behind the Australians, was unable to get through. After foundering in knee-deep swamps, the men reached Totore on the afternoon of 16 October, and went into camp at a nearby point called Guri Guri, 'the most filthy, swampy, mosquito infested area,' Colonel Miller noted in his diary, that he had ever seen.
    "A raft and log crossing was attempted at a nearby native village called Dove 1. Reconnaissance on the far side showed that a crossing there would put the battalion on the wrong route, and the project was abandoned in favor of a crossing at Dove 2, three miles downstream. On 18 October, 1500 feet of cable was dropped from the air at Guri Guri. No tools, tie wire, clamps, or bolts were dropped with the cable. Company M, under Capt. Frank N. Williams, and a platoon of Company C, 114th Engineer Battalion, carried the cable, strung out by hand, to Dove 2, and started establishing the crossing there.
    "Though still without tools, clamps, or tie wire, Captain Williams soon had a makeshift crossing over the Musa. It too had to be abandoned when ANGAU (Australian-New Guinea Administrative Unit) passed on the information that the trail leading out of Dove 2 was under seven feet of water and impassable to anything except small boats and native canoes.
    "On 20 October, Company M and the engineer platoon were ordered to rejoin the battalion at Guri Guri. They returned to find that the battalion's orders had been changed. Its instructions now were to turn north and march to Gobe, a point on the shore of Porlock Harbor, just around the east coast from Cape Nelson. The battalion was to be shuttled from Gobe to Pongani in such of the boats coming in with supplies from Milne Bay as could negotiate the treacherous waters around Cape Nelson. The 2d Battalion, which had been just behind the 3d on the Wanigela-Totore track, was ordered back to Wanigela, to be moved to Pongani by sea as soon as shipping was available. The elements of the 1st Battalion present at Wanigela were to follow immediately and the rest of the battalion was to be transferred to Pongani in the same fashion as soon as it reached Wanigela.
    "The overland march of the 3d Battalion from Totore to Gobe lasted four days and took it through mosquito-infested swamp. The men arrived at their destination exhausted. Many of them had picked up malaria in the swamp, and the health of the battalion began deteriorating almost at once. In the opinion of those who knew it best, the 3rd Battalion continued to show the ill effects of its march through the swamps along the Musa throughout the rest of the campaign." (Victory in Papua, qtd. in Blakeley 43)

"The first two luggers reached Wanigela on 17 October and were at once sent forward to Pongani with men and supplies. Early the following morning, a Fifth Air Force B-25 mistook them for the enemy and bombed the boats off Pongani. Two men were killed; Lt. A. B. Fahnestock, in charge of small boat operations for the COSC, and Byron Darnton, a veteran correspondent of The New York Times who had served with the 32nd Division during World War I, and had looked forward to reporting its operations in World War II. Several others were wounded, and one of the boats suffered such severe damage that it had to be withdrawn from the run." (Milner 108)

An additional factor in the delay was the fact that the 2nd Battalion, 126th Infantry, had not arrived in the forward area yet. It was still enduring its exhausting struggle over the Owen-Stanley's.

    "It was grueling march on a line paralleling the Kokoda Trail, and the men who made it will remember it forever as a living, wide-awake nightmare. For forty-two days they climbed, scrambled, clawed and suffered - many times cutting their own trail through some of the most awesome territory in the world.
    “The Battalion was commanded by LTC Henry A. Geerds, who suffered a heart attack several days out. The Battalion was then taken over by Major Herbert M. Smith of Neillsville, Wisconsin. Smith led his men through eerie ghost forests where phosphorus lighted the trees and they sank to their knees in mud."

    "It didn’t take them long to decide that there were items in their full-field equipment they could do without. They cut their blankets in half. They dumped their mosquito nettings at the side of the trail. Though it rained unrelentingly every afternoon and night they discarded their rain coats. Each man kept one uniform - the one he had on. They abandoned their shaving equipment and other toilet articles, keeping only their tooth brushes - with which they tried to keep their rifles clean.
    "Day after day the Battalion plodded through some of the worst and wildest jungle in the world. They went through waist deep streams and along trails that were waist deep channels of mud. Half the time they could not see the sky -  only matted leaves and vines. It would take five or six hours to go a mile, edging along cliff walls, hanging on to vines, up and down, up and down. Men got weaker and began to lag back . . . . There wasn’t any way of evacuating to the rear. Everyone was driven on by the fear of being left behind.
    "Their bones ached and dysentery had hit almost every man. They were filthy and caked with mud, and washed themselves only when they happened to be crossing a river. They climbed to 8,000 feet, to the top of the gap through which they stumbled over the Owen Stanleys. It took them seven hours to crawl the last 2,000 feet. They couldn’t march for more than 15 minutes without lying down and resting." (CPT William R. Fleischer, qtd. in Blakeley 46-7)

    “It was the eeriest place I ever saw. The trees were covered with moss a half a foot thick. We would walk along a hogback, straddling the trail, with a sheer drop of thousands of feet two feet on either side of us. We kept hearing water running somewhere, but we couldn’t find any. We could thrust a stick six feet down in the spongy stuff we were walking on without hitting anything real solid. It was ungodly cold. There wasn’t a sign of life. Not a bird. Not a fly. Not a sound. It was the strangest feeling I ever had. If we stopped, we froze. If we moved, we sweated.” (qtd. in Blakeley 47)

On 3 November 2000 a visitor to this web site, G. L. Thoman, offered this information, and his permission to include it here, about the fateful air drop: "The primary reason Col. Quinn was on the fatal air drop flight was that he was curious about how the air drops would work with parachutes. My father Capt. Kenneth R. Thoman was the supply officer of the 126th and had been flying on the air drops. They crammed in as many drops as daylight would permit. I think this was one of the first attempts at resupply from the air. The troops on the ground would clear a drop zone and the C-47 would come in at tree top level. On a signal from the co-pilot my father and three of his men would push the cargo out of the door. Hoping it would hit the drop zone and still be usable without parachutes. On the first day they used cargo chutes my dad and his men had the C-47 loaded. Col. Quinn drove up to the plane and told Capt. Thoman to stay back and he would handle the drop. The Col. wanted to see how the new chutes would work. On the first pass the chute opened inside the aircraft and fouled the elevators. The whole crew was lost. It was curiosity that cost the Colonel his life and saved my fathers."

NEW Photo added 1 Aug. 04 U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers of the 107th Medical Battalion, 32nd Division, boarding plane at Ward’s Drome, near Port Moresby, New Guinea, for trip to Pongani, New Guinea on 11 Nov. 1942.

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo from National Archives & Records Administration Soldiers of the 127th Inf., 32nd Division preparing to board ship on Bretts Pier, Brisbane, Australia on 11 Nov. 1942.	NEW Photo added 1 Aug. 04 U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers boarding the U.S.S. George Taylor in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia on 15 Nov. 1942, bound for New Guinea.	U.S. Army Signal Corps photo from National Archives & Records Administration HQ Co., 32nd Division conducting exercises aboard the U.S.S. George Taylor enroute from Brisbane, Australia to Port Moresby, New Guinea, in the early morning of 18 Nov. 1942.
U.S. Army Signal Corps photo from National Archives & Records Administration Soldiers of the 127th Inf., 32nd Division doing a rifle inspection aboard the U.S.S. George Taylor enroute from Brisbane, Australia to Port Moresby, New Guinea, on 18 Nov. 1942.

On 20 November 1942 the 2nd Bn., 126th Inf. arrived at Soputa. The exhausting struggle over the Owen Stanley Mountains was over, but the fight for Buna still lay ahead.

Blakeley, H. W., Major General, Retired. The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II.  The Thirty-second Infantry Division History Commission, State of Wisconsin, n.d.
Cannon, M. Hamlin.  Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954.
Drea, Edward J.  New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.
Hill, Jim Dan, Major General, Retired.  The Minute Man in Peace and War.  Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964.
Jungwirth, Clarence J.  Diary of a National Guardsman in World War II.  Oshkosh, WI: Poeschl Printing Company, 1991.
Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1957.
Papuan Campaign - The Buna-Sanananda Operation.  Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1945.
The Red Arrow - 1955 - The 32nd Division, Wisconsin National Guard.  n.p., 1955.
Smith, Herbert M., Lieutenant Colonel, Retired. Hannibal Had Elephants II.  Eau Claire, WI: Rev. William A. Heins, 1995.

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